From Flache & Macy (2011)

The conventional wisdom says that polarization can be effectively countered by increasing contact between people with different views. Here’s a very interesting paper that challenges this. The authors simulated ‘cavemen graphs’, i.e. graphs with a number of tight but disconnected clusters, and show that adding new ties leads to reduced polarization when it is assumed that the valence of interaction is positive, i.e. actors can only be more or less attracted to those who are similar. However, when valence can be negative, meaning that actors are averse to those with differing views, adding random ties increases polarization.

The authors state:

This implication of ‘‘small-world’’ theory depends on the micro-level behavioral assumption that interaction is exclusively positive in valence. This result should caution modelers of cultural dynamics against overestimating the integrative effects of greater cultural contact.

I’m not familiar with the practice or philosophy of simulation models and am quite unsure how seriously I should take it (the model naturally is highly simplified). But I am willing to, tentatively, consider the view that trying to reduce polarization by inconsiderately increasing connections may be a bad idea. Anyways, I found this paper really fascinating.

Flache, A., & Macy, M. W. (2011). Small Worlds and Cultural Polarization. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 35(1), 146–176.

From Dibble, Drouin, Aune & Boller (2015)

This time, something very much unrelated to my own research. A topic that has I’ve been quite interested in as of late is the effect of e.g. Facebook’s chat, and the algorithm that chooses which users to display at the top of the list, on people’s social and possibly romantic relationships. When discussing this theme, a friend of mine suggested a paper called Simmering on the Back Burner: Communication with and Disclosure of Relationship Alternatives.

The paper in question defines back burners as

people we are romantically and/or sexually interested in, who we’re not currently involved with, and with whom we keep in contact in the possibility that we might someday connect romantically and/or sexually. People can have back burners even if they’re already in a romantic relationship with someone else. Also, a former romantic and=or sexual partner can still count as a back burner so long as we still desire a romantic and/or sexual connection with them.

and goes on to note that most people have a number of them on their Facebook friend list whether currently engaged in a romantic relationship or not, most people do not tell about them to their partners (if they have any), most people identify their “closest” back burner as a casual or close friend, et cetera. I think my back burner count is probably lower than that of the average subject in this study, but I haven’t actually gone through my list, and then again, this study was naturally performed on American college students, a group whose social life is probably somewhat different from mine.

Interesting stuff. In hindsight, it is quite obvious that this phenomenon exists, but I very much like the name chosen by the researchers for it. I’m a bit sceptical of the results, though; according to the study, there’s a significant difference (statistically and substantially) in the number of “sexually desirable alternatives” identified by subjects depending on whether they are asked about back burners specifically or about contacts that they would like to be romantically or sexually involved with in general, and I’m not sure this should be the case. Also, as said, the study was done on U.S. college students, of whom most were of Asian origin (although this is probably more likely to mean that the study underestimates the phenomenon, if Asian Americans are more conservative than the average American).

Dibble, J. L., Drouin, M., Aune, K. S., & Boller, R. R. (2015). “Simmering on the Back Burner: Communication with and Disclosure of Relationship Alternatives”. Communication Quarterly, 63(3), 329–344.

From Clark (2016)

I argue that a hashtag’s narrative logic – its ability to produce and connect individual stories – fuels its political growth. — My case study of #WhyIStayed suggests that in the initial stage, hashtags that express outrage about breaches of gender justice are likely to invite online participation, while the escalation into online collective protest depends on the nature of interaction among multiple actors and their sociopolitical contexts.

A tweet can be about something as mundane as a user’s morning cup of coffee, but when combined with the networked power of hashtags, the political fervor of digital activists, and the discursive influence of collective storytelling, online personal expressions can grow into online collective action.

One of the areas I’m working on – hashtag activism, hashtag campaigns, hashtag advocacy, or whatever you want to call it, depending on your point of view – curiously seems to have been primarily advanced by the field of feminist media studies, with a journal with the same name having published three special issues on the subject in the past few years. This is one of the Feminist Media Studies papers, and it seems to argue that hashtagged displays of activism are particularly well-suited for online feminist discursive action, with the paper in question detailing how one particular hashtag was used to subvert mainstream narratives on domestic violence.

I think this is interesting stuff, even while I remain somewhat unconvinced of the practical relevance of it.

Clark, Rosemary (2016). “Hope in a hashtag”: the discursive activism of #WhyIStayed. Feminist Media Studies, 16(5), 787–804.

From Bruns & Stieglitz (2013)

There are three key areas of metrics which we suggest are of general use in the study of hashtag data-sets: metrics which describe the contributions made by specific users and groups of users; metrics which describe overall patterns of activity over time; and metrics that combine these aspects to examine the contributions by specific users and groups over time. Further, more specific metrics may also be established, but these soon become substantially more case-specific, and are no longer useful for a comparison of patterns across different cases. We discuss these areas in turn, and provide examples of how these metrics may be utilised for the study of individual hashtags as well as for comparative work across hashtags.

One of these days, I should just read through everything Axel Bruns and Stefan Stieglitz have published. This one, already a few years old, outlines some fairly simple but useful metrics for comparing hashtagged Twitter conversations and presents a few examples of such comparisons. Nothing mind-blowing, but it’s good that somebody’s put this stuff on paper.

Bruns, Axel & Stieglitz, Stefan (2013). “Towards more systematic Twitter analysis: metrics for tweeting activities”. International Journal of Social Research Methodology 16:2, 91-108, DOI: 10.1080/13645579.2012.756095.

From Feinberg & Willer (2013)

Some supporting evidence for the argument that environmental issues are usually framed in ways that resonate with the moral values of progressives, but not so much with those of conservatives. Namely, the harm/care domain of moral foundations theory, which progressives care much more about than conservatives do, is heavily emphasized, while purity/sanctity, which is important to conservatives but not at all to liberals, is absent. Also, they argue that conservatives can be made to care about environmental issues if they’re framed in the right way.

We argue that these differences result from a tendency for harm- and care-based moral arguments, bases of moral reasoning that are more compelling to liberals than to conservatives, to dominate environmental rhetoric. — Thus, we hypothesized that exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proen-vironmental efforts. — These results suggest that political polarization around environmental issues is not inevitable but can be reduced by crafting proenvironmental arguments that resonate with the values of American conservatives.

Feinberg, M., & Willer, R. (2013). The Moral Roots of Environmental Attitudes. Psychological Science, 24(1), 56–62.

From Poell, Abdulla, Rieder, Woltering and Zack (2016)

It has been argued that contemporary or recent protest movements taking place and being organized on social media, such as the Occupy movement, are characterized by a logic of ‘connective action’ in which the sharing of personalized ideas, images, memes by individual activists unaffiliated with established organizations is of importance, and in which formal leadership is absent or unimportant.

This paper critiques that view, by looking at the Facebook page Kullena Khaled Said (We are all Khaled Said) which played a role in bringing about the revolution in Egypt that toppled Mubarak’s regime, and showing that the page’s admins, in their own way, took a leadership role in the events. They then tie this to the idea of ‘connective leadership’, in contrast to more traditional social movement leadership, characterized by the use of social media instead of mass media, steering of discussion and participation instead of giving orders and proclaiming views, of coordinating streams of information and networks of people instead of a formal organization, and so on.

This ties well with my own emerging views on the topic. Social media and modern technologies have not made organizations and leaderships irrelevant or useless, but they have, in some cases, changed their dynamics.

Taken together, the examination, on the one hand, reaffirms Castells’ (2012), and Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) observation that the 2011 protest wave was not initiated or coordinated by formal SMOs and prominent activist leaders. — On the other hand, our analysis compli-cates the idea that this was an uprising organized by the crowd through self-motivated online sharing. It suggests that the sharing of grievances, as well as more complex pro-cesses of protest mobilization and coordination, was facilitated and shaped by what has been labeled as connective leadership. — Whereas social movement leadership appears effective in motivating protest participation through mass media, connective leadership, in its focus on actively involving users in the articulation of protest, seems especially suitable for the social media age.

Poell, T., Abdulla, R., Rieder, B., Woltering, R., & Zack, L. (2015). “Protest leadership in the age of social media”. Information, Communication & Society, 4462(June), 1–21.

From Lamba, Malik and Pfeffer (2015)

This one looks at whether bursts of controversy on Twitter have an effect on the behaviour of firestorm participants, applying the idea of “biographical consequences of activism”.

On the other hand, if firestorms arise from existing social ties, it would point to firestorms being a consequence rather than a cause of other action, and if there is no relation to social ties, it would be inconclusive but, as social actions are embedded in networks of social ties, it would suggest firestorms are of little importance.

Going back to our theoretical motivations, it seems that at least among the firestorms we sample, we see no evidence of the type of social change associated with action that has biographical consequences on participants. This suggests that, at least along this dimension, firestorms should not be a source of anxiety for targets nor a source of satisfaction for opponents; firestorms in general do not create the conditions to lead to larger and more long-term actions, at least among the mass of participants.

The method (comparing mention networks before, during and after a firestorm, and with mention networks of non-participants) is a bit rudimentary, but I like the point of departure.

Lamba, H., Malik, M. M., & Pfeffer, J. (2015). “A Tempest in a Teacup? Analyzing Firestorms on Twitter“. In 2015 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (pp. 17–24). Paris, France.

From Feinberg, Willer and Kovacheff (2017)

Studies 1-3 provide consistent evidence that the use of extreme protest tactics led observers to feel less social identification with the movement and, as a result, support the movement less. This effect was found for a variety of extreme protest tactics – including the use of inflammatory rhetoric, blocking traffic, and vandalism – and affected perceptions of diverse movements. Finally, we explored the motives underlying the potential use of extreme protest tactics, finding that strong advocates for a cause and social movement activists believed extreme protest tactics would be effective not only for raising awareness of, but also recruiting popular support for, their cause (Studies 4a & 4b).

This working paper argues that the use of ‘extreme protest tactics’, i.e. civil disobedience and the like, decreases (immediate) popular support of a movement or cause. It has a long list limitations, so I’m not entirely convinced yet, but I’ll have to keep an eye on this.

Feinberg, Matthew and Willer, Robb and Kovacheff, Chloe (2017). Extreme Protest Tactics Reduce Popular Support for Social Movements. Available at SSRN:

From Zhang & Counts (2016)

We also find that the anti-abortion side exhibits greater unity and greater intensity of emotions expressed, and that male constituents overall express moral values and personal concerns that are more in line with anti- abortion than females.

We also find that using only male Twitter messages lead to a better fit for policy diffusion than using female Twitter users. This shows a dominant role for male ideology in the diffusion of recent anti-abortion policy.

While these findings make sense given the wave of abortion legislation in the anti-abortion direction, they are also disconcerting because of the outsize impact of abortion policies on the lives and bodies of women.


Zhang, Amy X., and Counts, Scott (2016). “Gender and Ideology in the Spread of Anti-Abortion Policy.Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM.

Superforecasters-ennustukset vuodelle 2017

Osallistuin Facebook-ryhmä Superforecastersin (ei todellistä yhteyttä samannimiseen kirjaan) järjestämään “hupaisaan, mutta äärimmäisen kilpailuhenkiseen” ennustamisaan. Ryhmä tuli vastaani sattumalta, mutta otolliseen aikaan: olen pitänyt rationalistiskenen harrastamaa ennustusten esittämistä kiinnostavana ideana, ja olin jo alkanut rustailla omia vuotta 2017 koskevia veikkauksiani SSC:n mallin mukaan.

Ajattelin julkaista tässä omat veikkaukseni sekä muutamia kommentteja niihin liittyen. Heikki Sairasen sivuilta löytyy koosteita kaikista kisan vastauksista.

  1. SDP saa puolueista eniten ääniä kuntavaaleissa vuonna 2017: 39,5 %
  2. Kokoomus saa kuntavaaleissa eniten ääniä Helsingissä vuonna 2017: 54 %
    Uskon kisasta vihreiden ja kokoomuksen välillä tulevan varsin tiukka.
  3. Piraattipuolue tai Feministipuolue saavat kuntavaaleissa läpi vähintään yhden valtuutetun kuntavaaleissa vuonna 2017: 3 %
  4. Marine Le Pen valitaan Ranskan presidentiksi vuonna 2017: 36 %
  5. Helsinkiin valitaan naispuolinen pormestari 2017: 29,35 %
    Diippi (ja todennäköisesti virheellinen) matematiikka johti tähän kahden desimaalin tarkkuudella annettuun vastaukseen. Arvelin todennäköisyyden, että vihreät valitsee ehdokkaakseen naisen olevan noin 50 prosentin luokkaa (vastausajan päättymiseen mennessä Anni Sinnemäki ei ollut vielä ilmoittautunut ehdokkaaksi), ja todennäköisyys vihreiden nousulle suurimmaksi puolueeksi oli arvioni mukaan aiemman vastauksen perusteella 46 prosentin luokkaa. Jos vihreät ei ole isoin puolue, en usko naispormestaria tulevan kovin todennäköisesti muuta kautta.
  6. Länsimetro liikennöi Matinkylään asti kaikilla asemilla 15.8.2017 mennessä: 60 %
    Tämä pohjautui yksinkertaisesti Länsimetron omaan arvioon. Saattaa olla muutenkin optimismin väärentämä veikkaus, sillä olen töissä Otaniemessä eikä metro yhtään haittaisi.
  7. Suomi ei ole enää Reporters Without Borders -järjestön lehdistönvapautta mittaavalla listauksella viiden parhaan joukossa vuoden 2017 julkaisussa: 10 %
    Pääasiallinen syy ounastella tätä on kai Sipilä-kohu. En usko sen riittävän.
  8. Uusien turvapaikanhakijoiden määrä Suomeen nousee yli 6000:een Maahanmuuttoviraston mukaan vuonna 2017: 40 %
    Vuonna 2016 näin ei ilmeisesti käynyt. Jälkikäteen ajateltuna veikkaus on varmaan vähän alakanttiin, koska todennäköisyys uuden pakolaiskriisin leimahtamiselle ei liene pieni.
  9. Euroopan unionin jäsenmaassa tapahtuu vuoden 2017 aikana terrori-isku, jossa kuolee yli 50 ihmistä: 57 %
    Kisassa tämän kysymyksen mediaani 75 %. Tämän kokoluokan iskut eivät ole kuitenkaan olleet kovin yleisiä, joten pidän moista varmuutta vähän liioiteltuna.
  10. Suomen työpäiväkorjattu bruttokansantuote vuoden 2017 kolmantena neljänneksenä nousee vuoden 2016 kolmanteen neljännekseen verrattuna Tilastokeskuksen mukaan: 70 %
    En tosin usko, että päästään merkittävästi plussalle.
  11. Kaikissa TNS Gallupin ja Taloustutkimuksen puoluekannatusta mittaavissa gallupeissa perussuomalaisten kannatuksen keskiarvo on yli 10,0 prosenttia vuonna 2017: 40 %
    Ilmeisesti haettiin kaikkien vuoden galluppien keskiarvoa. Tällä hetkellä PS on aika matalalla. Näemmä uskon kuitenkin persuihin enemmän kuin keskivertovastaaja.
  12. SDP vaihtaa puheenjohtajaa vuoden 2017 aikana: 60 %
  13. Punnan arvo euroina on yli 0,85 euroa 31.12.2017: 90 %
    Ehkä hieman turhan varovainen vastaus.
  14. Juha Sipilä on Suomen pääministeri 31.12.2017: 84 %
    Jos saisin harkita uudemman kerran, antaisin tälle pienemmän todennäköisyyden.
  15. EU tai USA asettaa uusia talouspakotteita Venäjälle vuonna 2017: 33 %
  16. Öljyn hinta on yli 50 dollaria/barreli 31.12.2017 markkinoiden sulkeutuessa Nymexillä: 68 %
  17. Timo Soini on yhä Perussuomalaisten puheenjohtaja 31.12.2017: 85 %
    Myös tätä saatoin pitää turhan itsestäänselvyytenä, mutta saas nähdä.
  18. Donald Trump on Yhdysvaltain presidentti 31.12.2017: 95 %
    Suurin kysymys tässä kai on, potkaiseeko Trump tyhjää. Mies on kuitenkin jo seitsemänkymppinen.
  19. Suomen miesten jalkapallon A-maajoukkue voittaa vähintään yhden MM-karsintaottelun vuoden 2017 aikana: 27 %
    Minulla ei ole harmainta aavistusta koko aiheesta, joten päätin katsoa viimeisten vuosien tuloksia ja tehdä arvion niiden perusteella. Sitten tajusin tehneeni sen vähän höpöhöpölogiikkaan perustuen.
  20. Valtio päättää lisäpääomittaa Talvivaaraa vähintään 50 miljoonalla eurolla vuoden 2017 aikana. Aiemmin päätettyjä pääomituksia ei lasketa: 24 %
  21. Markkinoille julkaistaan täysin itseajava auto* vuoden 2018 aikana: 42 %
    Tämä on siitä kiinnostava kysymys, että vastausjakauma on kaksihuippuinen: kaikkein vähiten painoa on 0,5:n tienoilla.
  22. Euro on virallisena valuuttana käytössä kaikissa seuraavissa maissa Kreikka, Espanja, Italia, Portugali vuoden 2019 lopussa: 52 %
  23. Euro on Suomen virallinen valuutta vuoden 2019 lopussa: 79 %
    En usko Väyrysen vaalivoittoon.
  24. Teknologinen työttömyys* (teknologia syrjäyttää enemmän työpaikkoja kuin luo uusia) on yleisesti hyväksytty fakta vuoden 2029 loppuun mennessä: 58 %
    Todella moni vastaava oli antanut tälle lähellä sataa olevia todennäköisyyksiä. Itse en olisi asiasta aivan niin varma. Tosin kysymys on myös varsin tulkinnanvarainen.
  25. Ihmistasoinen (AGI*) keinoäly on kehitetty vuoden 2029 loppuun mennessä.
    *Artificial general intelligence (AGI) is the intelligence of a (hypothetical) machine that could successfully perform any intellectual task that a human being can: 17 %
    Jälleen kysymys, jossa valtaosa vastauksista on nollan tai sadan prosentin tuntumassa. Todettakoon, että asian mittakaavan huomioiden 17 % on minusta järisyttävän suuri todennäköisyys.
  26. Donald Trump valitaan uudelleen Yhdysvaltain presidentiksi 2020 vaaleissa: 57 %
    Se, säilyykö Trump hengissä ikänsä huomioiden, on jälleen merkittävä kysymys. Istuvalla presidentillä on kuitenkin usein etulyöntiasema. Kiinnostavaa kyllä, valtaosa vastaajista ei usko tähän.
  27. Ihminen on käynyt Mars-planeetan pinnalla vuoteen 2035 mennessä: 49 %
  28. Jokin uusi valtio hyväksytään ydinasevallaksi 2020 mennessä: 8 %
    Totta puhuakseni minulla ei ole tästä juuri hajuakaan.
  29. Iso-Britannia on EU:n jäsen 31.12.2018: 62 %
  30. Naton jäsenmaat ovat vuoden 2019 lopussa samat kuin 2016: 82 %
    Mediaani ja keskiarvo ovat 40 prosentin kieppeillä. Amatöörinä veikkaukseni on luultavasti huono.